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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 658

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CONCEPT OF CEAO DEFENSE PACT SHELVED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Oct 79 p 25

[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet]

[Text] "The chiefs of state of the member nations of the CEAO [West African Economic Community] and of Togo restate their intention to continue cooperation in the framework of the ANAD [Non-Aggression and Defense Assistance Agreement] which might be expanded to include other states in the region. They authorize the council of ministers and the secretary general to continue studies to be presented at the next summit meeting." This brief statement, read by Col Tavares de Souza, secretary general of the ANAD, aroused a great deal of comment. For the approximately 100 delegates and reporters present on Saturday, 20 October in the conference room of the El Ahmadi Hotel in Nouakchott, "ANAD is finished." The shelving of this agreement, signed in Abidjan in 1977 by the six member countries of the CEAO (Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta, Senegal, Mali) and Togo was the big event of the sixth annual summit meeting of the West African community held in the Mauritanian capital on 19 and 20 October.

Does this mark the end of ANAD? It is rather the failure of a "maximalist" concept, advocated by some countries which wanted to make of ANAD a true African defense pact. When the idea for ANAD was initiated in 1977, it was spurred on by the events in Shaba (Zaire). There were thoughts of a French-backed attempt to "make a show" against the Soviet and Cuban destabilization threats. The most ardent advocates of the pact were Senegal and the Ivory Coast, two whole-hearted friends of France. Togo shared their views. The other states of West Africa were more reluctant, but still signed. At the Franco-African summit meeting in Paris in 1978, there were some thoughts of expanding

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it which met with no success, despite Shaba II. Since then, emotions have cooled and the ANAD has not grown. At the same time, Senegal and Togo presented two proposals for a defense pact to the CEDEAO [West African States Economic Community], which includes 16 states, at the Dakar summit in May 1979.

Starting from the idea that there can be no development without security, the Senegalese put their cards on the table at the CEAO summit in Nouakchott. In order to be operational, they said, ANAD should have an integrated staff and should agree to hold joint military maneuvers. But on the other side, Mali wanted to stick to the terms of the 1977 agreement, binding signatories not to attack a neighboring country and to come to the assistance of those who are attacked. The Malian leaders refused to sanction a slippage "from a simple mutual assistance treaty to a joint defense pact." And why? Priority has to be given to development, without which there is no security.

Two other arguments were also advanced. The first is of a technical nature: "We hear about integration, but what is the use of putting together minimal military forces?" The second is political: ANAD has no effect on the bilateral agreements signed by the member states. "By means of a pact among Africans, we might be associated with non-African powers"--including France.

Other states expressed some reservations, the Ivory Coast seemed to be backing out, so only Togo and Senegal were left to defend the integration project in Nouakchott. Will they have more success in the CEDEAO, as President Senghor thinks? As the CEDEAO includes Nigeria, it could be that some countries, which are still hesitant, might become more receptive.

So we shall wait for the CEDEAO summit meeting in Lome in May 1980. The proposals presented this year by Senegal and Togo will by then have been combined into a single plan. But it still seems highly improbable for a consensus in favor of a true defense pact to be reached there. The Senegalese do not conceal the fact that they would be ready to move ahead just with the countries, either French or English-speaking, who wish to join with them. And that would be the real end of the ANAD.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DEVELOPMENT, COOPERATION COMMISSION MEETS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 p 2554

[Text] In its opening meeting of 11 and 12 September, the European Parliament Development and Cooperation Commission, with Mr Claude Cheysson, respective development commissioner, held a detailed exchange of views on the aspects of community development policy most likely to dominate its debates during the coming year.

It was Miss Colette Flesch (Luxemburg, liberal), reelected chairman of the commission, who presided over this very broad exchange of views which, as she said, should serve to define the commission's main political objectives. Messrs Giovanni Bersani (Italy, Christian Democrat), reinstated as cochairman of the mixed EEC-ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries] commission, Jacques Denis (France, communist) and Heinz Kuehn (Germany, socialist) were elected deputy chairmen and will compose the commission's staff along with Miss Flesch.

After paying tribute to the commission for its support in the past and to its new members for their demonstrated keen interest and knowledge of problems, Mr Cheysson spoke in particular about the renegotiations of the Lome Convention. The commission gave him strong support when he said he hoped that the new Lome Convention could perhaps coincide with a joint declaration of ACP countries and community member nations on human rights.

With regard to next year's budget for aid and development programs, the commissioner informed the commission that the Council of Finance Ministers had considerably reduced the amounts allocated for the commission's proposed projects.

The discussion also dealt with the following topics: budgeting of the European Development Fund [FED] (the commissioner agreed with Miss Flesch that the FED should be a part of the community budget itself); aid to non-associated developing countries; criteria determining the granting of emergency food assistance; origin regulations applicable to processed produce; the plan of generalized tariff priorities and the Nord-South dialog; EEC-Maghreb and EEC-Mashrek agreements, as well as the community's Mediterranean policy in general; activities of multinational corporations; urbanization in developing countries and depopulation of rural communities.

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During the meeting itself, the commission held preliminary exchanges of views on a certain number of unresolved questions, pending an agreement on the appointment of chairmen by the political groups. In particular, the commission discussed fishing rights off the coast of west Africa, the proposed budget for 1980, the next session of the EEC-ACP Advisory Assembly and the mixed commission's meeting to be held in Luxemburg from 8 to 13 October.

Finally, the commission decided to submit, at the time of the September session, an oral question with an accompanying debate to the commission on the massacres which recently took place in the Central African Empire and which have just been confirmed by an African investigative commission.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

NEW ACP-EEC CONVENTION TO BE SIGNED IN LOME

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 p 2554

[Text] The EEC and the 57 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries associated with it by the Lome Convention will sign, between 30 October and 6 November in Lome (Togo), a new convention organizing their cooperation for the next 5 years.

Having met in Brussels and after long negotiations, ministers of the ACP countries have finally chosen Lome instead of Khartoum as the site for signing the new text. The first convention was also signed in the Togolese capital.

It is now up to the EEC to choose a date between 30 October and 6 November for the signing. Certain points of the future convention are still not fully resolved and will be discussed between now and the end of October.

Under the future convention, for the next 5 years the EEC will grant ACP countries 5.607 billion European account units [UC] (1 UC = F5.9 or \$1.39) in aid, 180 million of which will be used for the operating expenses of community delegations in the ACP countries and 200 million for loans from the European Investment Bank (BEI).

Representatives of ACP countries pointed out in Brussels on 14 September that real aid from the EEC will therefore be only 5.2 billion UC and that it will not amount to the 10 percent increase over the current convention's aid, as promised by the community.

The EEC has finally decided to forgo making any reference to respect for human rights in the future convention. EEC representatives and ACP countries have agreed that the problem will simply be mentioned in the speeches to be delivered at the time of the signing ceremony.

The main innovation of "Lome II" concerns the creation, in the case of ores, of a system paralleling STABEX (Export Revenue Stabilization System), currently used for 19 groups of agricultural produce and iron ore. This system, intended to help ACP countries to maintain their production potential, will apply to copper, cobalt, phosphates, bauxite, aluminum, manganese, tin and iron ore.

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Between now and the end of October, the EEC and ACP countries will still have to reach an arrangement on questions such as the protection of European investments in ACP countries, the availability of certain processed agricultural produce (Surinam rice in particular) on the Common Market and measures designed to promote investment in enclaved, insular or less developed countries.

The EEC and ACP countries actually have different interpretations of the agreement which they reached in Brussels in June concerning the granting of the most-favored-nation clause with regard to protection of investments.

As Mr Bernard Saint-John, deputy prime minister of Barbados and acting chairman of ACP countries, pointed out at the close of the 14 September meeting, ACP countries recognize that there must not be any difference in procedure among the various EEC countries.

But they believe that in order to benefit from the advantages of being a most favored Common Market nation, the other member nations must also sign, bilaterally, an agreement in this respect with the ACP country concerned and grant it certain advantages in return. Moreover, as Mr Saint-John recalled, ACP countries do not want that clause to be retroactive, unlike the EEC.

The Debates

During the meeting, ministers of the 57 ACP countries had high-level contacts with EEC representatives in regard to points for which the two sides have different interpretations of the texts drawn up in June, particularly concerning the protection of European investments in ACP countries. In fact, ACP countries are of the opinion that the most-favored-nation clause in the case of investment can be applied only to EEC member nations which have signed a special agreement with them, an agreement which provides for certain advantages in return. The Common Market countries want the advantages granted to an EEC nation to be applied immediately to all other member nations of the European Community.

Unlike the EEC, ACP countries also feel that this clause on investments must not be retroactive and that it could be applied only to future agreements concluded in this area. On 14 September, ACP countries and the EEC also discussed the system paralleling STABEX (Export Revenue Stabilization, currently applied to 18 groups of agricultural produce and iron ore), which will be used for ores.

The ACP countries still want to add diamonds, chromium and graphites to the list of ores which can benefit from the system.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FRG LOAN FOR DAM CONSTRUCTION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2760

/Text/ After a meeting of the OMVS (Organization for the Development of the Senegal River) which was devoted to the topic of financial sources, one of the organization's officers, Amadou Aw, announced that after 15 years of planning for the construction of dams on the Senegal River, ground will be broken on 14 November.

Mauritania, Mali and Senegal, through which the river flows, are the members of OMVS. The organization is responsible for the building of two dams, one at Diama and one at Manantali.

The dam at Diama, near the mouth of the river, will protect the lower valley from contact with saltwater tides and will therefore facilitate a double growing season on about 30,000 hectares.

The dam at Manantali will be built on the Bafing, a tributary of the Senegal. It will allow the irrigation of 375,000 hectares of arable land, produce 8,000 kilowatts of electric energy to aid in the development of mining resources in Mali and eastern Senegal and will make the river navigable all year.

At the end of the meeting Aw said that the two dams were thought to be "complementary and profitable."

The total projected cost for these two dams, accounting for predictable inflation, is one-half billion dollars which has practically been acquired. This figure does not include factory and related work which will be financed otherwise.

In a pact signed with the OMVS on 2 October the FRG granted a loan of 4.7 billion CFA francs. The interest is low, .75 percent. Payments will be deferred for 10 years and then scheduled over 50 years.

Thus, the FRG's contribution runs as high as 22 billion CFA francs, apart from its portion (more than 25 percent) of the 4.5 billion given by the FED.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

LIBYA-GHANA AGREEMENT PROTOCOL--Following the visit to Libya of the Ghanaian ministers of energy and information, Dr Emmanuel Y. Ablo and J. S. Nabila, an agreement protocol was signed in Tripoli on 7 November between the two countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3214]

ANGOLA-SOUTH AFRICA MEETING--A secret meeting between Angolan and South African officials--the third since the beginning of the year--took place in mid-October on the Namibian border. Purpose: the protection of western installations and technicians working in southern Angola whose safety is threatened by the clashes between SWAPO and UNITA and the South African army. These technicians are engaged in reopening the Cassinga iron mines (property of West German Krupp), exploitation of the Benguela offshore oil deposits (discovered by American companies), and operation of the Cunene dam (where several scores of Portuguese work). [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Nov 79 p 20]

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CAPE VERDE

FISHING COOPERATION WITH ICELAND WILL BENEFIT POPULATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2825

[Text] A closely cooperative agreement is to be implemented between Iceland and Cape Verde, based on the common characteristic of these two countries, they both being insular and having the same potential economic resource: fish.

Within a very short period, Mr Einar Benediktsson, Iceland's first ambassador to Praia, has presented his letters of accreditation, an Icelandic technical delegation has arrived to discuss with Cape Verde officials certain technical aspects of fishing, and a number of Cape Verde officials have visited Iceland.

An Icelandic training ship is scheduled to arrive in Mindelo in early 1980 to train young fishermen to this archipelago over a period of 18 months.

This training of qualified fishermen, particularly as regards the use of electronic instruments for locating fishing banks, will provide the basis of the industrial fishing fleet the Cape Verdian Government is planning to build. The government is also planning to build an industrial fishing base.

Iceland will also take Cape Verdian trainees aboard its regular fishing vessels and will furnish Cape Verde with equipment to build a fishing school of its own.

Through this cooperation, the Cape Verdian Government expects to create a new economic resource for the 300,000 inhabitants of the archipelago, which is regularly ravaged by drought and where all the unirrigated farming areas are again this year being considered irremediable losses.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

DACKO MUST PROVE HIMSELF TO REMAIN IN POWER

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Oct 79 p 40

[Article by Pierre Gardel: "And Now?"]

[Text] The emperor has fallen, but everything is not yet resolved. In Place Valery Giscard d'Estaing, very close to the entrance of the army's general quarters, the bronze statue of Bokassa I was overturned and then dragged to the cemetery for burial. But the demonstrators did not only shout out their joy and rediscovered freedom. They overran Bangui to protest the retention of the dictatorship's former officials in power. "For the time being, everyone is behind Dacko because everyone is against Bokassa. But that may not last if he refuses to render the justice which the people expect." This is an attitude which was expressed very well by a banner waved on Sunday in the streets of Bangui: "The dog has fallen. Now let's worry about the pups."

With Dacko, the French brought about a smooth change. But that change will not convince everyone, particularly the dictator's real opponents, the high school and college students who survived his repression and who are today deprived of their victory.

They have already exerted pressure by voicing their disapproval of Henri Maidou, Bokassa's former prime minister and now vice president of the young republic, running counter to certain French interests which depend on Maidou.

They may be fighting tomorrow, if not for Ange Patasse, who is as discredited as Maidou, at least for the return of Abel Goumba, the chairman of the Ubangi Patriotic Front and the only opponent who never enjoyed the favors of Bokassa or Giscard.

They may also turn against the former French colonists whose paratroops, the "overthrowers" of Bokassa, they cheer today without managing to forget the part which they had in that dictatorship and the benefits which some of them derived from it. The first hours of the coup d'etat were marked not only by cries of "Long live France," but also by the pillaging of shops.

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The next few days will be crucial for David Dacko. He has one advantage: as long as the government has the good sense to please them, the French will subsidize the most urgent economic needs of a drained country. But it is precisely the French who have put David Dacko in power, not the Central Africans. He must therefore prove himself to them. By trying to protect too many officials of the former government--he himself was an adviser of Bokassa--or by retaining some of the emperor's former policies--such as relations with South Africa--he risks losing popular favor, which is ultimately rather limited, especially since he belongs to the Mbaka tribe, a minority which has monopolized power since independence. This means that nothing has been resolved with the fall of Bokassa. French troops came to carry out a coup d'etat. Will they remain to prevent a revolution?

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

NEXT FEW WEEKS WILL DETERMINE WHETHER DACKO A GOOD CHOICE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Oct 79 p 32

[Article by J.-M. Z.: "David Dacko, 'the Right Choice'?"]

[Text] Many young students who demonstrated in Bangui in January for Bokassa's abdication were not born when their current new president, David Dacko, was overthrown on New Year's Eve in 1965.

Born in 1930 in Bouchia, in Lobaye, David Dacko began his political career very young, encouraged by his uncle, Barthelemy Boganda. First a representative, he acceded to the highest office in April 1979 after eliminating Abel Goumba, too nationalistic for France's taste. For a long time, David Dacko was labeled the candidate of the Bangui Chamber of Commerce, the high spot of French business and financial interests. But Dacko took away the diamond and coffee monopoly from private companies, mainly French. He also began a foreign policy ... which was too independent in the eyes of Paris. This is what caused his downfall. To break up the developing flirtation with China, Jacques Foccart, then general secretary to the president and in charge of African and Malagasy affairs, decided to overthrow him. Today it is thanks to France that he has returned to power.

The teacher educated in Brazzaville has thus had fine revenge, perhaps in preparation since that day in 1976 when he agreed to become imperial adviser after years of domestic exile and humiliation. Did that apparent passivity mask a secret determination in that tall, straightforward man who exudes serenity? Since his childhood, spent in the village where his father, a farmer, also had a small grocery, he has retained his love of the land and preferred to devote his leisure time to his plantation, while his friends vainly tried to entice him into the nightlife of "stylish Bangui." After his return to politics in 1976, he continued to live in the house where he was born, with his wife and 12 children, the oldest of which, Bruno, is today pursuing linguistic studies in Paris. Since his training as a teacher, he has retained a fondness for reading, especially famous biographies.

Having returned as leader of the Central African nation and having inherited a disastrous situation, David Dacko will have to prove himself quickly by

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demonstrating that "imagination is in power." For the time being, he has not done so. He has appealed to former officials to form his administration, his own former officials as well as those of Bokassa.

The arrival of new men and overcoming tribalism will be the most convincing tests in the coming weeks. They will show whether President Dacko, who has been ascribed every virtue by some and every fault by others, was "the right choice" for the Central African Republic.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FRANCE UNABLE TO DISASSOCIATE ITSELF FROM NATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2609

[Editorial: "Exhilaration Tempered with Anxiety in Bangui"]

[Text] The circumstances of Jean-Bedel Bokassa's deposition and his replacement by his cousin, David Dacko, as head of the country, which has again become the Central African Republic, have left a feeling of uneasiness and have given rise to worried doubts in French and international public opinion, resulting in a reduction of France's prestige.

Reason of state was enough to excuse the unbelievable indulgence which the fallen emperor enjoyed from all of the highest French officials since the time that Jean-Bedel Bokassa overthrew the very man who has just deposed him in turn, without a drop of blood being spilled, it is true, but with the presence of several hundred French paratroopers in Bangui. Their quick intervention left hardly any doubt about the French Government's participation, since acknowledged by Mr David Dacko, in this 44th coup d'etat on the African continent since Ghana first acquired independence from the former colonial power in 1957.

The Central African Republic's strategic location and its uranium deposits explain why France cannot be unconcerned about its future. France is worried about maintaining a delicate balance in the heart of African and anxious to reserve for itself the exploitation of an ore more precious than gold. Probably no one would think of disputing France's right to protect its interests if it had not appeared so compromised with a tyrant on whom it did not spare its generosity, if it had not given the impression of rejecting the evidence, later revealed by the commission of African jurists, of the crimes committed against the Central African people, of which France could not have been unaware, and finally, if it had not invited the criticism of those who suspect France of having tried to prevent candidates which it considers too independent from returning to positions of leadership in the Central African Republic.

The emperor's deposition was hailed with outbursts of joy in Bangui, but the people's reactions were curbed with the announcement of the initial measures

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of the new chief of state. Several hundred teachers and students, the very ones who had the courage to rebel against the ex-field marshal, were amazed to see some of Jean-Bedel Bokassa's closest associates retained in their positions.

These initial reactions are a measure of the difficulties facing the new officials and, first and foremost, of the rivalry of the three opposition movements.

Mr Ange Patasse, prime minister at the time of Jean-Bedel Bokassa's coronation, has asked the French Government to withdraw its troops, which represent an "element of tension" according to him. He maintains that his movement, the MLPC (Central African People's Liberation Movement), and the troops reportedly at his disposal within the country itself are able to guarantee the safety of foreigners and of the 3,000 French residents in particular. The FPO (Ubangi Patriotic Front), under the leadership of Mr Abel Goumba, former interim government chief following President Boganda's death, dismissed at that time by Mr David Dacko and today a high official of the World Health Office in Benin, has called on the Central African people to stage a general strike to demonstrate their "discontent" by refusing to cooperate in any way with the new government, which he says has been "imposed from abroad." Finally, the former Central African ambassador to Paris, Gen Sylvestre Bangui, who claims that he has maintained solid friendships in the army and has founded the FLO (Ubangi Liberation Front), has arrived to find out firsthand about the intentions of the new officials. He hopes that he and his friends will receive important posts in the government to be formed.

Mr Abel Goumba appears to be the most popular leader among the country's teachers, students and intellectuals. He actually steered clear of any official responsibility during the reign of Jean-Bedel Bokassa. His philosophical and political views--he is considered a Marxist-Leninist--make any cooperation between him and Mr Ange Patasse or General Bangui unlikely.

Mr Dacko has said that he would not tolerate any unrest at the start of the new school year. The teachers and students who demonstrated in Bangui on Sunday, 23 September, defied the ban of the new chief of state. The only organized force on which he can rely today is represented by French troops. Well received by the Central African people in the climate of exhilaration created by the fall of Jean-Bedel Bokassa, will the same troops be ordered to intervene against the people if Mr Dacko's popularity or legitimacy should be challenged?

Unlike Uganda, which is today foundering in ethnic rivalries, it is rather ideological quarrels and personal conflicts which must be feared for the Central African Republic. Due to the shufflings of history, the various peoples have a much weaker feeling of tribal membership than elsewhere in Africa and feel much more that they are all members of a national community, whose use of a single language, Sangho, strengthens cohesion even more. This national feeling, which Barthelemy Boganda greatly helped to create, may be an advantage for the country.

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Due to the ruin of the economy and the disorganization of the administration, the Central African Republic will depend on foreign technical and financial assistance during the difficult period of the country's reconstruction. It is conceivable that France will not limit its aid. It may also imagine its role to be that of a mediator fostering reconciliation among the various factions in order to enable the Central African peoples to reach a decision on the choice of their leaders. Such a policy would result in assuring the security of those same peoples at the same time as that of the French and foreigners, as well as avoiding any premature commitment to any of those campaigning for the responsibility of guiding the country's destiny.

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CONGO

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL POLICY OF GOVERNMENT PRAISED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE In French 29 Oct - 11 Nov 79 pp 16, 17-18

[Article by Ginette Cot: "The Upswing"]

[Text] To keep up with the new rhythm of its revolutionary experience, Brazzaville wants to spell out the bases for equitable cooperation with Paris. That is the meaning behind the visit of President Sassou Ngueso to the French capital.

The economic and financial crisis, which have for years been raging in the People's Republic of the Congo, continue to create tremendous problems but, on the other hand, the political climate has changed radically and there is every indication that the hopes that sprang from the 5 February 1979 movement will not be disappointed. The striking thing above all is that the domestic work pace, which has been imposed by the new team, emerging from the Third Special Congress of the PCT (Congolese Labor Party) meeting between 27 and 31 March.

After this meeting, the Political Bureau and the administration drafted a considerable program which they have been trying very hard to carry out properly. After the troubles of the preceding period and the two years of demagogic and dictatorial rule by Yhomby Opango, the most important thing above all is to do everything possible in order to get together on agreements and commitments.

The very future of the revolution depends on that. It is known as a matter of fact that, if the Congolese people massively follow the 5 February movement, which it, itself, helped unleash, then no shortcoming will go unnoticed. And it is also known, on the basis of experience, that the domestic reactionary forces and its foreign allies will never fail to exploit the slightest discontent to their end.

Now, the situation is all the more difficult to restore since the intrigue policy of the "shah of M'Pila" left empty treasuries and made the crisis worse. This is so bad that, even today, it is impossible to pay civil

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servants regularly. Thus, the least aware elements who perhaps keep waiting for impossible miracles have made a pleasantry of the still justified slogan issued by President Denis Sassou Nguesso: "Live the hard life today in order to live better tomorrow."

However, when you ask the man in the street about the honesty of the new leaders and particularly the honesty of the new president, he will have to admit that these men are totally selfless.

The work done in seven months is likewise remarkable. First of all it was necessary to consolidate the gains of the 5 February 1979 movement and to restore democratic life--which had been wiped out after the assassination of President Marien Ngouabi, in March 1977, on new foundations.

Paralyzing Duality

This is what was done, after a month of campaigning, through the triple vote on 8 July: The adoption, by referendum, of the new constitution, the election of the People's National Assembly, and the people's governing bodies (the people's councils of the regions, the districts, and the communities), whose results with an overwhelming majority confirmed the victory of the red ballots, that is to say, those of the PCT.

The experience of the people's governing bodies--which tend to establish structures permitting decentralization of authority and full popular participation in political life--has begun in 1973. While the basic principles remain the same, the new organization took into account some points recorded earlier. In particular, they did away with the paralyzing duality situation in which the chairman of the party committee and the chairman of the region's people's council frequently found themselves. An attempt was made to make sure that the party leaders would no longer be confined to the capital but would also work in the interior.

Thus the political commissioners, selected from among the members of the party central committee and sent into the country's eight regions, right after the Third Special Congress of the PCT, were elected to the position of chairman of the people's council of the region while still being in charge of running the party in their zone. Their task is not only political but also and above all economic. They must as a matter of fact primarily concern themselves with agricultural production, with product, and they must also get the peasants to regroup in cooperatives. The objective is to give each region real economic power.

Consolidating the cohesion of the Congolese people, even further strengthening the unity of the progressive forces forged in the fight against the right-wing current of the party represented by Yhomby Opango and his helpers--that is the constant concern of the new leaders in Brazzaville. It is this preoccupation which is behind the amnesty measures ordered on

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8 August for persons implicated in the assassination of President Ngouabi, Cardinal Biayenda, as well as the persons responsible for the attempted coup on 14 August 1978. Thus, 56 prisoners were released, 7 persons had their punishment reduced by one half, whereas seventeen others benefitted from lifting the civic and political right deprivation measures or the house arrest they had been subjected to.

No "Innocents"

To make sure that nobody would misunderstand the significance of these clemency measures, President Denis Sassou Nguesso in particular, in his speech on the occasion of his inauguration, emphasized the following: "In view of the situation prevailing in our country and in order to be able to counter the perfidy and trickery of the allies of imperialism, we must come out with a clear-sighted policy which will take into account not only our desires but also the relative naiveness of certain social strata in our country and the likewise relative capacity of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in winning over a portion of popular opinion by employing sentimental considerations."

President Sissou Nguesso also said that this amnesty does not mean that the beneficiaries were "innocents" and that it must be "understood once and for all that the measures taken are intended to smash some elements harmful to the consolidation of national unity and are the manifestation of the party's magnanimity."

In this same spirit, the RPC [Congolese People's Republic] leader called upon Congolese in exile, who consider themselves to be in the opposition abroad (especially in France, where they very often engage in a systematic slander campaign against the revolutionary process under way in their country) to come back and contribute to the development of their homeland.

While the reactionary elements will not miss any opportunity to stir up even worse tribal rivalries, the decisions of 8 August could not fail to have an important impact. "As a matter of fact," it was emphasized at Brazzaville, "these measures, which the population had been calling for, considerably helped in reducing tensions and clearing the air."

This is especially true since there is no question of slowing down the fight against the bureaucratic and parasite bourgeoisie which bears a heavy responsibility in this crises.

And though there is no further talk of organizing the trial of the "shah of M'Pila" (there are other, more urgent problems to be solved and it would be inadvisable to revive tensions), the purge of party rank to remove elements compromised with the preceding regime is going forward. As for Yhomby Opango, his assets have been seized and he is still under arrest, as are some of his close aides.

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But, above all, the Congolese leaders are working hard to solve the most urgent economic and financial problem. In this area, the national enterprises have been getting priority attention. For example, they have just started a three-phase recovery program for the SUCO (Congo Sugar Refinery) whose output has dropped from 75,000 tons in 1970 to 5,700 tons in 1978; for this purpose, 10 billion francs CFA [African Financial Community] were released and they should make it possible to attain a production target of 14,000-15,000 tons in 1980.

Finally, to achieve greater profitability, INTELCO [International Telecommunications Office of the Congo] (the former France-Cables Company, nationalized in 1972) and the ONPT (National Postal and Telecommunications Office) were merged in August. Plans also call for organizing a conference of government enterprises in order to come up with a precise and in-depth diagnosis and to study the measures necessary to get them going again.

Other recent initiatives in the economic field include the following: The establishment of a Coffee and Cocoa office and a Food Crops office; the completion of a project on the development of the forests in the north which is a subject for negotiations with the World Bank; search for financing for the establishment of a paper pulp company at Pointe-Noire.

As for the first two-year development program, which is to be completed by the end of 1979, it is said at Brazzaville that its objective will be mostly attained. It is known that this program, aimed at the development of agricultural production, is entirely financed by the National Solidarity Fund which, established from monthly withholdings from the pay of salaried persons, will have collected 5 billion francs CFA. Agricultural output by the way must not be considered a marginal activity but must become the concern of all. And a slogan was launched at the start of the school year: "To each school, its own field."

Parallel to that, the RPC has been engaged in intensive diplomatic activities since the Third Special Congress of the PCT. President Sassou Nguesso went to Angola, Gabon, Zaire, as well as Ndjamena (in his capacity as coordinator of neutral forces to be established there, in cooperation with Guinea and Benin, in the Chadian capital), and he also attended the OAU summit at Monrovia as well as the summit of nonaligned in Havana.

In these two capitals, the Congolese leader developed a theme which is very dear to him: The need for developing regional and inter-African cooperation.

The visit of President Sassou Nguesso to Paris by the end of October should not surprise anybody if one realizes that France remains dominant in the RPC in economic and financial terms and if one realizes the evil

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role played by the former home country in the economic plot that has been choking the Congo. Among the subjects under discussion we have particularly the Congolese debt owed France, the matter of petroleum problems, and, generally, all matters connected with the exploitation of the Congo's national wealth (timber, coffee, cocoa, etc.).

What Revenues?

Just prior to the preparation of the next budget, the drafting of the second two-year program, aimed mostly at industrialization and recovery of government enterprises, something which consequently will require tremendous investment, the Congolese leaders must know for sure what revenues they can count on. There is talk of a petroleum output of 2.5 million tons, a figure which, together with the discovery of a new deposit, could come to 5 million tons in 1981. But guarantees are still required from ELF [Gasoline and Lubricant Company of France].

Everybody knows that the first three-year development plans failed because of the maneuvers of the oil companies which did not achieve their own estimates.

"We are not coming as beggars," it was emphasized in Brazzaville, "The important thing is to get together on the bases of equitable cooperation where each party gets what it deserves--we who have the wealth and those who exploit it." The important thing also is to figure out to what extent one can count on the cooperation of France with whom the Congo carries on 80 percent of its foreign trade. Considering all of the advantages which Paris derives from its dominant position in the Congo, as well as the connection of the latter with the franc zone, the least thing would be for Brazzaville to have an opportunity to get its equipment on the French market.

Finally, it goes without saying that Paris' African policy also raises many questions. This policy as a matter of fact is bound to worry the RPC which finds itself squeezed between the French military bases in Zaire, Central Africa, Chad, and Gabon.

The events in Bangui, which were forcefully denounced by Congolese radio and the press, may well have further aggravated this legitimate worry.

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GABON

BRIEFS

FOREIGN BORROWING AUTHORIZATION--The Gabonese National Assembly recently passed in Libreville presidential ordinances regarding foreign loans for Gabon. Ordinance No 23/79 of 5 June 1979 authorizes the state to borrow \$100 million from a banking consortium in which CITIBANK is prominent. This loan will be used to finance the total investment program for this year. This amount covers both optional and required programs in need of foreign resources. Ordinance No 35/79 authorizes the state to borrow from the Saudi Development Funds on a long-term basis. This loan amounting to 4.59 billion francs CFA will be used to finance telecommunications projects, as well as signalization projects for the Transgabonese railroad. The deputies also passed an ordinance requiring a special residence permit for Equatorial Guinean citizens wishing to establish residence in our country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ETMEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3218]

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GHANA

BRIEFS

SOVIET FRIENDSHIP DELEGATION--A 19-member delegation from the Soviet association for friendship among peoples led by K. K. Onitis, minister of communications from the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, arrived in Ghana on 8 November for a 7-day visit. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3214]

TOURIST CASINO TAKEOVER--Just before relinquishing power to the civilian government, the Ghanian military government decided to vest the controlling interest (51 percent of the capital shares) of all the country's casinos in the Ghana Tourist Development Company, a state-owned enterprise. The government felt this measure would best satisfy the needs of the tourists. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2829] 9399

NO NEW CREDITS--The Central Bank of Ghana has just made it known that foreign banks and export firms have refused to grant the country any new credits. Their decision appears to be based on Ghana's large indebtedness. According to the Central Bank's most recent economic bulletin, Ghana's short term foreign loan payments in arrears totaled 1.19 billion cedis (198 million pounds) on 31 July. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2830] 9399

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

TOURE's VISIT POSTPONED--Guinean President Ahmed Sekou Toure's official visit to France, which should have taken place at the end of November, has been postponed for the spring of 1980. French officials close to the Conakry regime intend to use the intervening period of time to establish a France-Guinea friendship association. The names of Giscardian former minister Andre Bettencourt, Ambassador Andre Lewin, Professor Jean Suret-Canale, and the owner of the Lefevre public works company have been mentioned. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 984 14 Nov 79 p 39]

IDA ROAD, RICE LOAN--The World Bank and its subsidiary for loans, the IDA [International Development Association] have approved on favorable conditions credits totalling 23.4 million dollars to Guinea. Of this total, 13 million dollars will be allocated to a project which will include the repair of 1500 kilometers of roads and the maintenance of 4600 additional kilometers. The remaining 10.4 million dollars will be used for a rice-growing project aiming at strengthening the institutions, human resources, and technical capacities of Guinea in rice production. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2885] 6108

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

SPAIN-USSR REFRIGERATION COMPLEX--The construction of a new refrigeration complex, with a capacity of 2000 tons, will begin next January at Bissau. This new complex will be completed by a mixed Spanish-Soviet fishing enterprise. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2885] 6108

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MALI

BRIEFS

INTERIM PRESIDENCY DECREE ABROGATED--On 13 October Radio Mali announced the abrogation of the decree of 16 July 1979 which confers the interim presidency of the republic on the deputy secretary general of the sole party, the Democratic Union of the Malian People [UDPM], Col Amadou Baba Diarra. Although Radio Mali gave no reason for the abrogation, observers believe that this measure was motivated by concern for conformity with the constitution of the country, which does not confer the subject post of the deputy leader of the UDPM. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2885] 6108

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MOZAMBIQUE

BASIC SECTORS OF 10-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN DETAILED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2844

[Text] We continue here our report on the principal sectors involved in Mozambique's next 10-year development plan (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS No 1770, 12 October 1979, p 2781).

Fishing--Fishing in inland and oceanic waters is an important economic factor for Mozambique. Its shrimp resources are known and its shellfish resources are being inventoried. Tuna can provide a sizable contribution.

Industrial fishing is scheduled to reach adequate production levels over the next decade to meet the fresh, dried, frozen and canned fish requirements of the population. Fish meal will be used to feed cattle. Exported surpluses will provide a source of foreign currency. The government's main preoccupation will be the building of a fishing fleet, fish processing and refrigeration plants, and means of transportation of frozen products.

Transportation--The main elements of the transportation program over the next decade will be the following: Priority will be given to the railroad network (electrification of principal routes, construction of new routes, interregional links). In addition, promotion of inland and coastal navigation will be stepped up to provide transportation for heavy merchandise (which presupposes the building of naval repair facilities, they being also justified by Mozambique's geographical position). Trucking facilities will play their particular part in interdistrict transportation and the air fleet will provide medium- and long-distance links.

Ports--The country's geographic situation confers upon it a special role in regard not only to its enclaved neighbors but also to its neighbors having access to the sea, in that certain Mozambique ports are, for the latter, the most economic means of routing their imports and exports.

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The Port of Maputo will handle all exports from the country's southern region. In addition, the handling of the neighboring countries' coal, iron and ores exports will require modification of this port's railroad gauge and probably the building of a new port at Ponta Dócela.

The Port of Beira will have to respond to the agricultural and industrial growth of the provinces of Tete, Manica and Sofala. It is Zimbabwe's natural port (in the event this country becomes independent), as well as that of Botswana, Zambia and even certain regions of Zaire.

Nacala is exceptionally well-situated. It will handle the traffic that flows from the expansion of agroindustrial and mining enterprises throughout the northern Zambezi region and the neighboring countries.

Communications--Efficiency, speed and dependability of communications are essential requirements in all realistic planning and successful economic development. Much needs to be done in this field to achieve efficient operation of the postal services, the telephone network and the telex network, both domestically and internationally. Some systems need revision, as in the case of the "letter-telegram"--transmitted and delivered like a letter but paid for at telegram rates--and the indefinite waits involved in trying to reach other points within the country by telephone.

Urban transportation--Plans to initiate new urban centers and develop existing ones are already producing studies of mass transportation within the large cities. The incessant oil price increases are making it necessary to look into electric energy as the principal source of energy for mass transportation, reserving conventional bus transportation for interdistrict and medium-sized urban center requirements.

Education--The continuing rise in birthrate has led the Mozambique government to step up its school-construction and teacher-training plans, the more so since Maputo has definitely decided to bring to an end the heritage of illiteracy that is hindering economic progress in most domains.

Public health--By the beginning of the next decade, Mozambique will have attained a level of 1.25 beds per 1,000 inhabitants in public health establishments, which--the authorities emphasize--is much when compared with what existed, but little in comparison with the needs that must be met.

A major funding effort must also be directed toward improving public sanitation and prevention measures, with a view to raising the average life expectancy by the end of the next decade (it is now on the order of 40 years). The public health services have already succeeded in lowering the infant mortality rate to 150-200 deaths per 1,000 births.

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Defense--According to President Machel, Mozambique's next 10-year plan must take into account the popular defense and security forces--to maintain peace. However, the effort deployed in this regard must be paced by growth in the national economy.

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RHODESIA

CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF LONDON TALKS EXAMINED

Probable Compromise

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Sep 79 pp 27-29

[Article by Mohamed Maiga]

[Text] Regardless of the results, the direction taken during the first few days by the Lancaster House debates (JA [JEUNE AFRIQUE] No 976) is a victory --even a symbolic one--for British diplomacy. For its agenda has prevailed and has been accepted by the four delegations: Great Britain, Monseigneur Abel Muzorewa (Salisbury Government), Ian Smith (Rhodesian white minority) and the Joshua Nkomo-Robert Mugabe tandem (Patriotic Front). Thus it has been decided that a new constitution for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia will be discussed for 2 or 3 weeks (the exact duration of the conference, entirely financed by Great Britain, is not known). Once adopted, this new constitution will define the procedure for possible future general elections supervised by Great Britain with the assistance of certain Commonwealth nations, as promised by Mrs Margaret Thatcher during the 22nd summit meeting of this "gentlemen's club" in Lusaka (Zambia) from 1 to 8 August 1979. This is because the Patriotic Front withdrew its initial demand--maximalist as in the beginning of all important negotiations--that a "peace conference" and not a "constitutional conference" be held in London. There was a real and profound difference of views.

In the minds of the guerrilla leaders, it was especially a question of ending the war. As a precondition to that peace, Robert Mugabe's ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), more than Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), demanded the complete dismantling of the army, of private militias and of all security forces of the Salisbury Government, which were to be replaced by the guerrillas of the Front, the core of the future national army. The constitution and distribution of power would be discussed afterwards. Some, including Monseigneur Muzorewa, were soon complaining about a coup d'etat, which was in no way justified militarily.

The reality is that no side in London is in a position to dictate--which favors Great Britain's arbitrating position, although the latter is suspected

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of leaning too much in favor of Zimbabwe-Rhodesian officials. All factions present are aware of serious internal difficulties and are under strong diplomatic pressures.

Thus when the prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Abel Muzorewa, claimed that the decolonization of his country was completed and argued on that basis to demand that London recognize his "democratically elected" government, everyone knew that he was "bluffing." For despite the halo initially conferred on him by his dubious election victory in April, his position has weakened considerably in the past year. Of course, his party (United African National Union, UANC) still holds the majority of parliamentary seats reserved for blacks (44 of 72). But the credibility of forming a government was weakened in June by the defection of the UANC's deputy chairman, Mr James Chikerema, and six other representatives--who have since formed the Zimbabwe Democratic Party--especially since the defectors accused the bishop of behaving like a dictator within the UANC.

The black prime minister has also abolished racial discrimination, a veritable apartheid, only on paper. Whites have retained all their privileges and blacks remain their subordinates more than ever. It is generally held that the Africans' hopes in the "little bishop's" election promises have been strongly eroded, even giving way to disillusionment. The election base of Monseigneur "Muz" has definitely crumbled. The prime minister also suffered a setback in his determination to end the war and to rally the guerrillas of the Patriotic Front. Only a few dozen of the 20,000 fighters in the "bush" returned to government ranks. Worse: one-sixth of the 20,000 casualties during 7 years of killing met their deaths between April and September 1979.

Of all the protagonists in the Rhodesian crisis, Ian Smith is in the most delicate position. After 15 years of absolute European power, few whites are enthusiastic about fighting for a black government. Despite undeniable economic privileges, the future is becoming more and more uncertain for the Rhodesian colonists. The wily former prime minister cannot be unaware of this. Will he manage to convince a tense white community, sure of its divine right and goaded more and more by its reactionary extremists? Ian Smith is walking a tightrope: How is it possible to simultaneously stop the exodus of whites (more than 1,000 departures monthly) and get his friends to accept the necessity of reducing their privileges?

That will not be easy, in view of the fear aroused among whites by the least reform south of the Zambezi. In particular, the 5,700 farmers, the most powerful of the white lobbies, balk at the slightest change. However, the whites' "enlightened" wing, according to the HERALD newspaper, believes that "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia may prove to be reasonably generous with regard to questions such as the number of parliamentary seats reserved for whites, thus eliminating the risk of having to make an accusation of intransigence on relatively minor problems."

In reality, Mr Smith and Mr Muzorewa are also under strong pressure from their powerful protector: South Africa. Everything suggests that, contrary

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to their initial positions, Pretoria's leaders have finally supported Mrs Thatcher's initiative.

The Patriotic Front is in a similar position. There is serious dissent in its ranks; there is even talk of violent clashes between the ZANU and ZAPU armies. Nevertheless, if the guerrillas have unquestionably grown stronger and if they have disrupted the economy and government to a large extent, they are far from winning the war. The Front's supporters, i.e. the front-line nations (Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana), are finding it more and more difficult to support the weight of a war which is ruining their weak economies. Zambia, severely affected by the closing of the Rhodesian border (which costs it \$1 million daily) is anxious for the departure of Nkomo's army, ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army). Stronger (in men and material) and better staffed than the Zambian army, ZIPRA reportedly behaves as though it were in a conquered country. How far can Mozambique go in its support of Robert Mugabe's ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army)? More and more, Salisbury's troops are challenging the Mozambique army and civilian and economic objectives. Besides economic difficulties, Samora Machel will also have to deal with the grumbling of his army, helpless in the face of Rhodesian attacks. Mugabe will have to take this into consideration and compromise. As for President Julius Nyerere, sharply criticized by some of his OAU peers for his role in Uganda, he is anxious to reestablish his characteristic image as a peaceful and "reasonable" man. Hasn't he shown a certain degree of neutrality in the Rhodesian conflict?

The spirit of compromise is gaining strength as the Rhodesian war becomes more tribal every day. Each of the many domestic parties now has a tribal base and army. The same phenomenon is affecting not only the Front as such, but each of its components (ZAPU and ZANU) as well. Are we witnessing the historic opportunity of Mr Joshua Nkomo? He is the only one who has a receptive audience in every tribe. But above all, he is the unanimous choice of the great powers, both Eastern and Western, and enjoys the support of South African "liberals," reputedly led by Prime Minister Pieter Botha.

Key Man

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Sep 79 p 29

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima]

[Text] He probably goes unnoticed in the corridors of Lancaster House in London, where the constitutional conference on Zimbabwe opened on 10 September. It is true that his imposing physique makes it possible to identify Joshua Nkomo in the middle of a dense crowd and from dozens of meters away. The Patriotic Front's coleader does not have the profile of a "romantic hero," however. No boots or fatigues, no beret like Che Guevara, he does not seem to share the opinion of those who maintain that clothes make the man. This massive man prefers civilian attire to a soldier's uniform.

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That is because Joshua Nkomo belongs to that old generation of African tribunes capable of stirring up the largest auditoriums. At the Monrovia summit, it was his turn to deliver an address in the name of all liberation movements. And what a moving speech it was! And yet unanimity has not been reached to make the Patriotic Front the sole representative of the people of Zimbabwe. A further disappointment for this man, who has linked his name with the national liberation struggle? Perhaps not, inasmuch as his long, hard fight has enabled him to subdue his passions to judge men and things philosophically. "I am neither frustrated nor bitter," he said recently in Washington, referring to his 30 years of involvement in African nationalist groups, an involvement which has won him glory but also 11 years of detention in Rhodesian prisons.

Yet Joshua Nkomo admits that he has many regrets. He is now 60 years old. Every week, young black nationalists are joining the army by the hundreds. "I would like to be younger," he sighs. "I would like for the times to be different, for everything happening now to have occurred sooner. Like all generals, I was at the front, but not in combat. My role is to organize." Passing regrets. Joshua Nkomo immediately continues: "In the beginning, I wasn't eager to be the leader of the liberation movement. By accident, I found myself faced with the problems of the struggle. Power does not interest me. I am given over to work."

With Robert Mugabe, his partner in the Patriotic Front, Nkomo commands about 7,000 guerrillas based in Zambia and Mozambique. Their objective? The effective transfer of power from the white minority to the black majority. When Ian Smith, the Rhodesian prime minister, worked out his plan for domestic government in accord with three moderate black leaders in March, Joshua Nkomo refused to endorse it. Now the man who continues to be the best known among the leaders of the Zimbabwe liberation movement is today the key to a peaceful future for his country. That is why he has been approached by various protagonists.

Ian Smith alternately used Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda and Tiny Rowland's LONRHO (London and Rhodesian Mining and Land Company) to bring Nkomo to break his alliance with Robert Mugabe. For many, in fact, he is the moderate figure acceptable to the British, Americans and Soviets at the same time. Will he be tempted to play the game by accepting a compromise with the domestic leaders, i.e., Bishop Muzorewa? He would then have to drop Robert Mugabe to take part in new elections. In the best of hypothetical situations, the possible rallies and support of various dissidents would not enable him to acquire more than 33 percent of the votes. Under these conditions, his adventure would consist of swapping loyalty to the Patriotic Front for a hypothetical reversal of alliance, whose fruits he is not sure of harvesting. Can he abandon Robert Mugabe without discrediting himself to conclude a tactical alliance with the domestic leaders?

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Whatever Joshua Nkomo does, Zimbabwe seems to be heading toward a period of uncertainty, as other countries on the brink of independence have done, a period marked by a struggle for power, regroupings and settlement of accounts. Angolan-style confrontations are to be feared for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

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SENEGAL

POLITICAL SITUATION SAID TO BE FAVORABLE TO LEFT

Paris AFRIQUE ASIE in French 29 Oct - 11 Nov 79 pp 14-16

[Article by Same Ngosso: "A Time of Tension"]

[Text] Has the government definitely given up trying to cope with the economic problems that face the country?

"The situation in Senegal is no longer just preoccupying; it is grave." This severe warning was sounded by Master Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party) and should not be considered a suggestion intended to increase his party's following.

Numerous information items have as a matter of fact since April in corroborating the idea that Master Abdoulaye Wade might not be wrong. All of the formations on the left moreover are unanimous on this point and there is no lack of voices who confirm this analysis even within the Socialist Party, the party in power.

"The administration is the only one," we were told by a young civil administrator attached to the ministry of finances, "not to notice the tension prevailing among the peasants and the workers and it is the only one in underestimating the social consequences of its austerity plan."

As a matter of fact, in the face of the serious employment problem inherent in the economic crisis facing Senegal, everything is happening as if the administration had definitely given up. Thus we are everyday witnessing personnel cutbacks and threats of layoffs in various enterprises, without the particular ministry concerned taking any action. One might even think that the administration is incapable of providing the slightest solution or even simply plugging the worst gaps.

The liquidation on 26 August of Bud-Senegal, a mixed-management company, in which the government was the majority stockholder with 61 percent of the shares, is confirmation of this. In all Senegalese circles, people keep wondering about the reasons for this hasty decision which--what is

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even worse--was made without the workers concerned and the labor unions being informed. People are worried about the 3,000 persons employed by that industrial truck-gardening company which every month, according to the daily LE SOLEIL, distributed more than 500 million francs CFA [African Financial Community] in wages while being "a price regulating agent who had a tendency to get the foreign companies in the area to go up likewise."

Considering its economic importance, Bud-Senegal as a matter of fact deserved a less brutal fate. This is especially true since a group of Senegalese had submitted a rather hefty folder to the prime minister many months ago with a view to resuming this operation. But it seems that the administration shows the method consisting of ridding itself of all of the "trouble makers" whereas it was up to it, the administration, to assume responsibility for the difficulties of these enterprises.

Now, there are many of those, especially among the government companies. And while it is true that the charges made by Bud-Senegal workers against their managers are not entirely without foundation--Mr Bator Diop, according to the workers, used the equipment and personnel for his own individual goals--it remains nevertheless true that the real reasons for this business failure are those listed by the outgoing board of directors. In other words, the 1.5 billion francs CFA deficit left by the old management, taken over by foreigners between 1972 and 1976. Likewise, the disappearance of SOSAP (Senegalese Outfitting and Fishing Company), 2 years ago, following a deficit of 9 billion francs CFA, is to be blamed on the excessive confidence displayed by the administration in the European "managers."

The least one can say is that the Bud-Senegal affair came at a moment that was highly critical for the Socialist Party. Not only did the performance of Senegal at Havana rub the majority of the Senegalese--who thus became fully aware of the nature of their country's foreign relations--the wrong way but the odor of scandal was everywhere. The most commented-upon scandal, the one that puts the administration in a tight spot, is according to all evidence the scandal involving the ONCAD (National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development). The official story is considered by everyone to be nothing but a cynical device for the exploitation of the peasant and did not seem to satisfy anybody; that official version blamed about a hundred crooked "scalesmen" for the 1 billion francs CFA embezzled in that outfit. The managing editor of the journal ANDE SOPPI, Mr. S. Dioulde Thiam, was trying to find out "how scalesmen, who are at the very bottom of the ONCAD chain, could for two years become guilty of embezzling such a tremendous sum of money? Who were their accomplices and on what echelon were they?" According to Mr. S. D. Thiam, this question is all the more important since the national daily LE SOLEIL reported about a series of documents that were quickly burned at the office of the directorate-general. But far from answering all of these questions, the administration seems to have preferred to fire the general-manager of the office.

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In addition to the ONCAD, whose history is full of predators, the insistent rumors circulating on the account of the socialist mayor of Dakar and the second-ranking treasurer of the National Assembly, Mr Lamine Diack, if true, entail the risk of seriously damaging the party in power. This personality, according to the rumor, supposedly was "dragged" before the prime minister by the current minister of urban development and housing, Mr Oumar Ba, on charges of embezzling close to 100 million francs prior to 1978, the time he was responsible for land conservation.

All of this of course has caused friction among Socialist Party leaders who powerlessly stand by as their political base is eroded away. And attack against the person of the prime minister, Mr Abdou Diouf, are becoming more and more numerous.

Several among the old party bosses, kicked out of the administration for the benefit, it was said, of the "managers," would not hesitate a minute to have some fun in this connection; nor would they fail to make allusion to the only villa in their possession, compared to the real estate holdings of that recently promoted manager. These internal quarrels at the same time must be charged against the preparations for the time after Senghor which the various party clans have been engaging in for several months as well as the panic which has taken hold of certain leaders.

The decision to start judicial prosecution of professor Sheikh Anta Diop--leader of the RND (National Democratic Rally), on charges of illegal political activities, thus comes as no surprise. At a moment when the political climate, according to the journal LE POLITICIEN is charged with electricity, such an operation has the advantage of creating a diversion in view of the personality charged and his following in the country. One could not say the same thing about Ahmed Niasse, who is being prosecuted for the same reasons, because his pseudo-Islamic party for the liberation of Senegal, founded in Paris, is completely unknown to the Senegalese. Son of the Khalif Niasse and not of Baye Niasse, founder of the "medina-Baye" in Kaolack, Ahmed Niasse is a rather doubtful personality who was several times charged in cases involving checks that bounced. The fact that his campaign is being conducted in France--a country to which President Senghor is very much attuned--perhaps explains this amalgam.

Favorable Terrain

Today, more than ever before, the political terrain is favorable to the Senegalese left. But once again we find that no unit seems to be able to promote the advent of a new majority in the country. Reduced to a kind of semi-clandestinity, due to the laws denying them the right to existence, political formations, such as the RND, the PAI [African Independence Party]-Monsarev of the COSU (United Senegalese Opposition Coordination), each for itself, can no longer claim to be the point of convergence for the entire left.

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As for the PDS, the only opposition party represented in the Chamber of Deputies, many Senegalese hoped that it will be able to propose a program liable to draw the positions of the left-wing party over to its place. It has of course two aces: Its legal status and the following it has acquired.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

TALKS WITH EGYPT--Secret negotiations have been underway since September between the Egyptian and South African governments. In difficulty because of the cut-off of Iranian oil, the Pretoria authorities would like to buy Egyptian oil. Egypt would like to benefit from South African technology and...a loan of 5 billion dollars. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Nov 79 p 40]

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TOGO

BRIEFS

IRON PRODUCTION--The Togolese iron and steel industry, inaugurated last 12 January by General Eyadema, now possesses a stock of concrete reinforcing rods of various lengths: 4 meters, 6 meters, 8 meters, and 12 meters which are available in 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19, and 25 mm. This plant was conceived to produce in a short time 20,000 tons of reinforcing bars per year for local consumption, and over the intermediate term it is planned for production capacity to rise to 40,000 tons per year. Togo could then be an exporter of concrete reinforcing rods. In order to double the initial tonnage, a plan to establishment plants for the direct smelting of Togolese iron ore would have to be launched. So by 1982, if plans are adhered to, the Lome plant may be fed to a large extent by raw material from the national ore deposit. Mr Zarifou Ayeva, former minister of information, and director-general of the National Iron and Steel Company told TOGO PRESSE that "Economic difficulties have delayed the start-up of production. We had to make many approaches in Europe before overcoming these difficulties in order to enable the plant to enter its real production phase. It was in March and early April last year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79, p 2890] 6108

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURE LOAN--On 24 September the French Central Bank for Economic Development accorded a loan of fr 4.5 million to the Organization for Economic Development (SOFIDE) of Zaire. The loan will refinance SOFIDE's aid to the NOGUEIRA company, which the government has asked to oversee the collection and marketing of agricultural products from the various provinces, especially Kasai. This is a major act of rehabilitation of the rural economy which has been destroyed for the most part by the disorganized channels of marketing. The loan will finance a program for acquiring means of highway transportation which is indispensable for the restoration of the distribution network for products (coffee, rice, corn, etc.). /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2773/ 9161

OIL PRODUCTION--The Cometra Oil Company has announced that the production of crude oil in Zaire's maritime zone amounted to 1.89 million barrels in the third trimester of 1979. Its affiliate, the Muanda Oil Company, accounted for 17.72 percent of the production. Today production amounted to 5.66 million barrels. This means a daily average of 20,732 barrels and a yearly production of a million tons. According to recent predictions the total annual production for 1979 will be as high as 7.6 million barrels, including all reserves. The previous prediction was 7.7 million barrels. In 1978 the production was 6.6 million barrels and in 1977 it was 8.25 barrels. Exploration drilling, scheduled to begin in mid-July was delayed until 24 August. The work is underway at the moment. Of course, there is not yet enough evidence to permit conclusions on the results of the drilling. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2773/ 9161

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